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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 6 FEBRUARY, 1952 NUMBER 2
THE PARADOXICAL SELF-INCRIMINATION RULE
CARL H. IMLAY*
ORIGINS OF THE RicHr
The Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution provides inter
alia that no person ". . . shall. be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. . . . Such provision is the complement of the
Fourth Amendment which guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Both were framed to protect the individual and render him
inviolable against the ever increasing power of the state.1 The framers were
well aware that power cornipts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The
dignity of the individual was of paramount consideration, and while it was
desired to invest the individual with the residuum of all power not expressly
granted to the government, it was expedient to insure that man again would
not be subjected to the inquisitorial methods adopted in early times for
the discovery of crime. The political struggles in England, bringing in
their wake trials for political crimes with star chamber methods, impressed
upon the people the necessity of protection from unlimited inquiry into
private affairs under the guise of law. It was the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments that gave constitutional sanctity to the familiar saying that an
Englishman's home is his castle, and rendered the individual impervious to
the encroachment of the state.
But the right guaranteed to the individual in a criminal case not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself did not originate with the framers
of the Constitution. Although we like to think of our bill of rights as
indigenous to our own soil, many of the rights evolved gradually and were
given expression and permanence in the common law of England. It was
not to secure the fundamental rights of man primarily that the framers
of our Constitution met at the Annapolis and Philadelphia Conventions.
The generating source of our Constitution lay in the rising volume of
restraints upon commerce which the Confederation could not check.2 The
bill of rights was only added later by popular demand. By the time that
the Fifth Amendment was framed, the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum
accusare had already become firmly engrained as a part of the common law
of England, and as one of the basic human rights.
'Member, Washington, D. C., bar.
1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2. Justice Wiley Rutledge, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITir 25 (1947).
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Cruel methods of interrogating persons had obtained in the continental
system, and in England until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British
throne in 1688. While admissions or confessions of the prisoner when
voluntarily made have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating
evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection
with a crime under investigation, the case with which the questions put to
him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the
witnes unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him
into a corner and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so
painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir
Nicholas Throckmorton and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system
so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in
the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded
upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent
acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. So deeply did the iniquities
of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American
Colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to
question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a
maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in
this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.,
There can be no doubt that long prior to our independence the doctrine
that one could not be compelled to testify against himself had reached its
full development in the common law, was there considered as resting on
the law of nature, and was imbedded in that system as one of its great and
distinguished attributes, In Burrowes v. High Commission Court' Lord
Coke makes reference to two decisions of the courts of common law as early
as the reign of Queen Elizabeth wherein it was decided that the right of a
party not to be compelled to accuse himself could not be violated by the
ecclesiastical courts. This right was thereafter well established as part of
the common law.5
Aside from its incorporation as part of the Fifth Amendment to our
Constitution, it is found in the bill of rights of all of the state constitutions.
THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT
Probably no constitutional provision has been more criticised in late
years than that of the self-incrimination clause, because of the prominence
of congressional and grand jury investigations into large scale racketeering,
and Communist activity. The hasty critic demands the logic of a rule that
shields the witness from inquiry, and closes the door on embarrassing facts
3. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896); Boyd v. United States, supra note 1.
4. Bulst 49 (1616).
5. Felton's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 371 (1628); LORD HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
304 (1st ed. 1736); GILBERT, EVIDENCE 139 (2d ed. 1760); 2 HAWKINS' PLEAS OF THE
CROWN Ch. 31 (6th ed. by Leach 1787). See also Brown v. United States, 168 U. S.
568, 574-575 (1897).
6. Stone, 1. in State v. Ruff, 176 Minn. 308, 223 N.W. t44 (1929).
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of a sometimes sordid existence. Be it remembered, however, that the self-
incrimination clause has a far deeper meaning than that of a shield between
the felon and his sovereign. This provision is in pari materia with other
great and basic rights, e.g., (1) the nle that a man is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, and (2) the rule that the state in a criminal proceeding
must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. To allow unfettered interro-
gation of a witness would shift the burden of proof in a criminal case, and
would change the presumption of innocence. It is for this reason that our
constitutional system allows an accused to stand mute while the state
proves its case against him.
The right does not only include an accused in a criminal trial. A
witness, as well as a party, is protected by the law from being compelled
to give evidence that tends to criminate him or to subject his property to
forfeiture. t And this right extends to a witness in any investigation.8 A
witness in a civil proceeding is entitled to claim the privilege. 9 There is a
distinction between the rights attending a defendant in a criminal trial and
a witness. The defendant, of course, is not compelled to take the stand
at all, whereas the witness is. An accused who voluntarily offers testimony
upon any fact thereby waives as to all other relevant facts, because of the
necessary connection between all, his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 10 It goes without saying that the accused cannot be sub-
poenaed to testify against himself. The witness who is not the accused,
however, stands on a different footing because he can be subpoenaed to
take the stand. A witness who testifies in matters that may incriminate
him must claim his constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment
from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
or he will not be considered to have been "compelled.""' If the privilege
is not claimed by the witness, it is considered to be waived.'2 Once the
witness has launched into testimony that incriminates him, he cannot renege
and refuse to testify further because the privilege is then deemed to be
waived as to that particular subject matter.13 And once the witness has
testified in a proceeding, that testimony may be used against him in a
retrial of the same case. 4
The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness
is asked to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal
7. Boyd v. United States, supra note 1; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
8. Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920).
9. Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 266 (1913).
10. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
11. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
12. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); United States ex. rel. Vajtauer
v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Burrell v. Montana, 194 U.S. 572
(1904). But cf. United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S.
690 (1937).
13. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950); United States v. Harrison, 121
F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1941). See note 19 A.L.R.2d 378.
14. Woerde v. United States, 158 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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charge. If the criminality has been taken away, the amendment ceases
to apply. The criminality provided against is a present, not a past, crimi-
nality which lingers only as a memory and involves no present danger of
prosecution. 15 Where there is an immunity statute which affords the witness
absolute immunity from prosecution for any crime developed. from such
testimony, he cannot avail himself of the privilege. 16 The immunity must
be complete, however, and not merely partial.'7 One cannot refuse to answer
where the crime revealed is barred by the statute of limitations.', The
danger must be real and appreciable with reference to the ordinary operation
of law, not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having
reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improb-
able that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.' 9
One of the important aspects of the privilege aganst self-incrimination
in the Federal Constitution is that it does not apply to state action. A state
can prosecute a witness for any answer he may give in a federal investigatiofi
or trial, even where he is given complete immunity by federal statute from
prosecution. One cannot refuse to testify in a federal trial on the basis that
his answers may incriminate him under state law.20 Conversely one cannot
refuse to testify in a state prosecution on the ground that he will be incrimi-
nated under a federal or foreign law. The refusal must in every case be
grounded on the fact that the sovereignty of the court or investigating body
could prosecute him for his criminatory answers. An immunity under state
law given to a witness testifying in a state investigation does not prevent a
federal prosecution for crimes revealed by the answers.2' Generally an
immunity granted by one sovereign does not stay the power to prosecute
of another sovereign. 22
The privilege is purely personal to the witness himself.2" An officer
of a corporation in whose custody are its books, is given no right to object
to the production of the corporate records because they may disclose his
guilt. He does not hold them in his private capacity, and is not therefore
protected against their production or against a writ requiring him as agent
of the corporation to produce them. 24 Unless the witness himself is being
15. Hale v. Ienkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
16. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). For a history of the Congressional
immunity statute see United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 335-342 (1950).
17. Cf. Glickstein v, United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
18. Brown v. Walker, supra note 16.
19. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
20. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); United States v. Murdock, suora
note 12; Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913); Brown v. Walker, suPtra note 16.
21. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
22. Queen v. Boyes, I Best and S. 311 (1861); King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox,
7 St. Tr. (N.S) 1049, 1068 (1720); State v. Thomas, 98 N.C. 599, 4 S.E. 518 (1887).
23. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Goldstein v. United States,
316 U.S. 114 (1942).
24. Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923). The right does
protect against the production of incriminating documents of a private nature however.
Boyd v. United States, supra note 1.
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called upon to incriminate himself, the fact that someone else may be
incriminated is not sufficient to exclude evidence.25 In short, the privilege
only allows the witness to protect himself from being "hoist by his own
petard."
The privilege does not extend to a corporation. 6 It has also been held
that radio recordings made some years before to be played over the air,
when played in court in a treason prosecution, did not violate the defend-
ant's right not to be compelled to be witness against himself.2t
An important aspect of this constitutional right has been recently
revealed in connection with inquiry into Communist Party membership.
The Supreme Court in Blau v. United States8 held that it is a violation of
the Fifth Amendment to compel a witness who objects on the ground of
self-incrimination to testify before a grand jury in response to questions
concerning his employment by the Communist Party or intimate knowledge
of its operations when there is in effect a statute such as the Smith Act,
18 U.S.C. 2385, making it a crime to advocate, or to affiliate with a group
which advocates overthrow of the government by force, and it is immaterial
whether answers to the questions asked would have been sufficient standing
alone to support a conviction, when they would have furnished a link in
the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of the witness for violation
of the Smith Act. The full implications of the Blau case are not yet under-
stood and will undoubtedly be revealed as cases arise. It might be observed,
however, that a great variety of questions might furnish such a link and it
is hoped that the implications of this case will not be extended so as to
inhibit disclosures which do not afford a clear causal connection between
an answer and the fact of illegal membership in the Communist Party.
TiaE ANOMALIES OF ITS APPLICATION
Like any other constitutional right, this right guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment does not exist in a vacuum. It arises in the course of trials,
grand jury investigations, and lately, in the course of legislative investigati 9n.
The government, state, or committee attorney will ask a question, the
witness will refuse to answer, and a trial judge will be called on to determine
whether there is any showing of incrimination. This is not a difficult
decision where the very nature of the question calls for an incriminating
answer, e.g., "Did you shoot John Doe?" It is not difficult either where the
very nature of the proceeding reveals the incriminating -nature of the ques-
tion, as, where in a grand jury investigation of a murder, the witness is
asked whether he owns a Colt automatic. The real difficulty arises where
25. United States v. Johnson, 165 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.s.
852 (1948).
26. Porter v. Mueller, 156 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1946).
27. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (1950).
28. 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
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during a general grand jury investigation, 9 or a legislative committee hear-
ing, a witness is asked a question perfectly colorless on its face. Until some
showing is made of how the answer could be incriminating, only the witness
can see the casual connection between his answer and some crime. Take
for example the case of a witness who is called before a grand jury which is
investigating criminal activity generally in a locality. The witness is asked
what his occupation is. Suppose his occupation is trafficking in narcotics.
The nature of the question does not reveal its incriminating nature in such
a case. Nor does the nature of the proceeding. He is naturally presumed
to be innocent of crime. If he explains how the question would incriminate
him, his very explanation may in some cases incriminate him. Thus the
situation is a paradox. Certainly a witness cannot be the sole judge of his own
answers. And yet there is nothing to indicate to the court how the answer
would be incriminating. If an investigation is a federal one, he may want
to protect himself from some state prosecution (which he has no right
to do), or to shield some friend or organization (which he has no right to
do either). The better rule is to require that in order to exercise his right,
he must in some way indicate to the court circumstances which suggest that
his answer might be criminatory.
The courts in this country were early faced with the problem of how
to distinguish between a bona fide claim of privilege and an attempt to
use the privilege for ulterior motives. During the trial of Aaron Burr, his
secretary Willies" was called by the government to identify a letter wfitten
in cipher. He refused to answer a question as to whether he understood
the cipher at the time the question was asked. The conclusion of Chief
Justice Marshall was that the answer would not criminate him since it
asked only for his present knowledge rather than knowledge at the time
he was alleged to have copied the letter. The latter, the court believed,
would have implicated him in a charge of treason. However, it is obvious
that under certain circumstances even the witness' present knowledge might
implicate him since it might have been derived from knowledge at the time
he made the copy. It seems probable that if the witness had stated that
any knowledge he presently had was the same as that he had at the time
of the copying, his plea of privilege would have had to be upheld for he
would then have provided the court with the additional circumstances that
there was a real danger that his answer would incriminate him. In the
absence of that showing the witness was required to answer. Chief Justice
Marshall announced the following rule (pp. 38-40):
When two principles come in conflict with each other, the
court must give them both a reasonable construction, so as to pre-
serve them both to a reasonable extent. The principle which
29. A grand jury can question witnesses and conduct an investigation without
reference to any particular crime, and without an indictment before it. Cf. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
30. In re Willie, Fed. Cas. No. 14,692e (D.C. Ky. 1807).
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entities the United States to the testimony of every citizen, and
the principle by which every witness is privileged not to accuse
himself, can neither of them be entirely disregarded .... When a
question is propounded it belongs to the court to consider and to
decide whether any direct answer to it can implicate the witness.
If this be decided in the negative, then he may answer it without
violating the privilege which is secured to him by law. If a direct
answer to it may criminate himself, then he must be the sole judge
what his answer would be.
Later cases have made explicit that which was implicit in In re Willie;
namely, that whenever it does not appear from the nature of the question
or the evidence already before the court at the time the question is asked
that the answer can imperil the witness, even though it is possible that the
answer can incriminate the witness, his bare claim of the privilege is not
sufficient. The witness must go further and indicate in some way that his
claim has a real foundation in fact, and is not made in bad faith. A case
frequently cited as expounding this rule is The Queen v. Boyes.Ya Cockburn,
C.J. there stated at 329-330:
w .. It was also contended that a bare possibility of legal peril
was sufficient to entitle a witness to protection; nay, further, that
the witness was the sole judge as to whether his evidence would
bring him into danger of the law; and that the statement of his
belief to that effect, if not manifestly made mala fide, should be
received as conclusive.
With the latter of these propositions we are altogether unable
to concur. Upon a review of the authorities we are clearly of
opinion that the view of the law propounded by Lord Wensleydale,
in Osborn v. The London Dock Company, 10 Exch. 698, 701, and
acted upon by V. C. Stuart, in Sidebottom v. Adkins, 3 Jur. N.S.
631, is the correct one; and that, to entitle a party called as a witness
to the privilege of silence, the Court must see, from the circum-
stances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness
is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend
danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer.
This language was quoted with approval in Brown v. Walker"2 and Mason
v. United States.88 Professor Wigmore refers to the decision by Mr. Justice
Mitchell in State v. Thaden,84 which in turn adopts the rule expressed in
The Queen v. Boyes as one which "leaves nothing to be added, and (which)
ought to remain the last word in the development of the rule."' 8 It is
abundantly clear that the witness must make some showing as to how his
answer would incriminate him. The difficulty lies in the nature of the
showing. This difficulty was well expressed by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Weismanma
Obviously a witness may not be compelled to do more than
31. 1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).
32. Brown v. Walker, supra note 3.
33. Mason v. United States, supra note 19.
34. 43 Minn. 253, 45 N.W. 447 (1890).
35. 8 WiGMoRE, EviDzNcE 406 (3d ed. 1940).
36. 111 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1940).
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show that the answer is likely to be dangerous to him, else he will
be forced to disclose those very facts which the privilege protects.
Logically, indeed, he is boxed in a paradox, for he must prove the
criminatory character of what it is his privilege to suppress just
because it is criminatory. The only practicable solution is to be
content with the door's being set a little ajar, and while at times
this no doubt partially destroys the privilege, and at times it permits
the suppression of competent evidence, nothing better is available.
The Weisman case clearly laid down the principle that when there is no
showing from the evidence or the nature of the proceeding as to how an
answer to a question could incriminate the witness, that witness has a
burden of showing to the court in some manner how the question could
incriminate him.
Recently in United States v. Hoffman, 7 the Supreme Court again had
the situation of a witness found in contempt for failure to answer questions
which were prima facie innocent, and the criminatory character of which
was not revealed to the court by the previous testimony or surrounding facts.
The facts were these:
A grand jury of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania undertook an
investigation of frauds on the United States Government involving violations
of the customs, narcotics, and internal revenue liquor laws of the United
States, as well as violations of the White Slave Traffic Act, perjury, bribery,
and other criminal laws of the United States, and conspiracy to commit
all such offenses. Hoffman appeared as a witness before this grand jury and
refused to answer certain questions on the asserted ground that his answers
might incriminate him of a federal offense. The questions and answers are
as follows:
Q. What do you do now, Mr. Hoffman?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Have you been in the same undertaking since the first of the year?
A. I don't understand the question.
Q. Have you been doing the same thing you are doing now since the
first of the year?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Do you know Mr. William Weisberg?
A. I do.
Q. How long have you known him?
A. Practically twenty years I guess.
Q. When did you last see him?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Have you seen him this week?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Do you know that a subpoena has been issued for Mr. Weisberg?
A. I heard about it in Court.
37. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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Q. Have you talked with him on the telephone this week?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Do you know where Mr. William Weisberg is now?
A. I refuse to answer.
Later Hoffman and his counsel appeared in open court and the Government
challenged Hoffman's claim of privilege. The court, after hearing the
questions and answers and after hearing argument by Hoffman's counsel,
found that there was no real and substantial danger of incrimination of a
federal offense, and ordered him to reappear before- the grand jury and
answer the questions. Hoffman further refused to answer the questions,
and an order finding him guilty of criminal contempt was signed, committing
him to five months' imprisonment. No showing was made by Hoffman as
to how the answers could incriminate him. It was not until after the order
adjudging him guilty of contempt was signed, he had noted an appeal, and
bail pending appeal was denied that Hoffman produced any showing at
all. At that time he filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Allowance of Bail
Pending Appeal and attached an affidavit setting forth, inter alia, that when
he refused to answer the questions he had assumed that the grand jury and
the court "were cognizant of, and took into consideration, the facts of which
he based his refusals to answer," that he had "since been advised, after his
commitment, that the Court did not consider any of said facts," and
"considered only the bare record." This affidavit then went on to state
that the investigation was stated, in the charge of the court to the Grand
Jury, to cover "the gamut of all crimes covered by federal statute; that
Hoffman had been publicly charged with being a known underworld
character, and a racketeer with a twenty-year police record, including a prison
sentence on a narcotics charge; that while waiting to testify before the Grand
Jury he was photographed with the head of the Philadelphia office of the
United States Bureau of Narcotics; that lie was questioned concerning the
whereabouts of a witness who had not been served with a subpoena and
for whom a bench warrant was sought by the Government prosecutor."
Hoffman further contended that it was on the basis of these facts that he
had based his refusal. In support of these averments Hoffman attached
clippings from local newspapers of dates current with the grand jury pro-
ceedings, reporting the facts asserted in the affidavit. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the motion to strike this
matter and affirmed the conviction. 38 With respect to the question regarding
Weisberg, the Third Circuit held unanimously that "the relationship be-
tween possible admissions in answer to the questions . .. and the pro-
scription of [pertinent federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. 371, 1501)]
would need to be much closer for us to conclude that there was real dinger
in answering." As to the questions concerning Hoffman's business, the
Third Circuit observed that "It is now quite apparent that the appellant
38. 185 F.2d 617 (3d Or. 1950).
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could have shown beyond question that the danger was not fanciful." That
court did hold that the data submnitted in the supplemental record "would
rather clearly be adequate to establish circumstantially the likelihood that
appellant's assertion of fear of incrimination was not mere contumacy." But
it concluded that the information offered in support of the petition for
reconsideration of bail "was not before the court when it found appellant
in contempt, and therefore cannot be considered now." Thus limited to the
record originally filed, the mnajority of the court was of the opinion, with
respect to the business questions, that "the witness here failed to give the
judge any information which allowed the latter to rule intelligently on the
claim of privilege for the witness simply refused to say anything and gave
no facts to show why he refused to say anything." One judge dissented,
concluding that the District Court knew that "the setting of the controversy"
was "a grand jury investigation of racketeering and federal crime in the
vicinity" and "should have adverted to the fact of common knowledge that
there exists a class of persons who live by activity prohibited by federal
criminal laws and that some of these persons would be summoned as wit-
nesses in this grand jury investigation."
The Supreme Court in reversing the Third Circuit held:39
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because
he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself - his
say- so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.
It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), and to require him to answer
if 'it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken. Temple v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 899 (1881). However, if the witness,
upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in
the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in
court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection
which the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result. The trial judge in appraising the claim 'must be governed as
much by his personal perception of the. peculiarities of the case as
by the facts actually in evidence. See Taft, J., in Ex parte Irvine.
74 Fed. 954, 960 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1896).
The Supreme Court held in effect that the notoriety of the particular grand
jury investigation of "rackets" in the district that "will run the gamut of
all crimes covered by federal statute" should have put the court on notice
of the criminatory character of the questions. As far as the Weisberg
questions are concerned the Court held that they were intended to adduce
the contacts that Hoffman had with a notorious fugitive witness. The Court
said pf these questions:40
The three questions [about Weisberg] if answered affirmatively,
would establish contacts between petitioner and Weisberg during
39. 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
40. Hoffman v. United States, supra note 37 at 488.
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the crucial period when the latter was eluding the grand jury; and
in the context of these inquiries the last question might well have
called for disclosure that Weisberg was hiding away on petitioner's
premises or with his assistance. Petitioner could reasonably have
sensed the peril of prosecution for federal offenses ranging from
obstruction to conspiracy.
The Supreme Court also held that the District Court should have con-
sidered the supplemental record based on newspaper clippings showing that
Hoffman was a notorious "underworld character and racketeer" filed two
weeks after the contempt order."1
It is the opinion of this writer that the Hoiftman case weakens the
standard set forth in United States v. Weisman42 by Judge Learned Hand
which requires a witness to show affirmatively how an answer could crimin-
ate him of a federal crime where that is not otherwise shown. That Hoffman
had a genuine fear of such a consequence is pure speculation. He may have
wished to shield others, or he may have been shielding himself from state
prosecution for some crime violative of state law - neither of which pur-
poses entitled him to assert the privilege. The only fact before the court
which revealed in any way how Hoffman could be incriminated by the
questions was that he was a witness before a grand jury investigating the
broad field of federal law violations. It is difficult to understand how that
fact alone could apprise the court of the criminatory nature of the colorless
questions asked. The evidence of newspaper publicity was submitted two
wccks after the contempt order was signed, and by usual standards, should
have been rejected. Tbe Hoffiman holding is hardly a clear guide for trial
judges to follow in weighing the fact of the criminatory character of a
question. If the judge, having no showing of the criminatory character of
a particular question, must speculate as to whether a possible answer could
"forge links in a chain of facts imperiling [a witness] with conviction of a
federal crime," 43 it will be very difficult to obtain the testimony of any recal-
citrant witness. If the appellate court delves into conjecture in reading the
cold pages of a record, it can label practically any question criminatory.
Another case illustrating the same difficulties was that of United States
41. It is a far cry from the Hoffman holding to that of Mason v. United States,
supra note 19. There a witness was called before a grand jury investigating gambling.
After he had testified that he had been sitting at a card table in a billiard parlor with
certain defendants, the witness was asked (1) was there a game of cards being played
at the table and (2) was there a game being played at another table. Another witness
was asked (1) if he saw anyone there playing "stud poker" or "pangini," and (2) if at
this same time he saw anyone playing a game of cards at the table where he was
sitting. The Supreme Court held that refusal to answer these questions was contempt
because there was no showing that under Alaska law it was criminal to sit at a table where
cards are being played, or to join in such game unless played for something of value.
The Court in that case held:
Further than this, we are of opinion that the danger to be apprehended
must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law
in the ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial
character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency,
so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.
42. Note 36 supra.
43. Hoffman v. United States, supra note 37, at 488.
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v. Greenberg.4" There the witness was subpoenaed as a witness before a
grand jury investigating violations of various federal laws. He was asked
the question "Are you in the numbers business now?" and he refused to
answer. After testifying that he knew numbers writers around 1133 West
Diamond Street in Philadelphia, he was asked "Who?", and he refused to
answer. In connection with questions about a certain telephone at the same
address he stated he did not use it "for my lawful business". He was then
asked the questions: "Do you use it for any other business?", "and what
business do you use it for?". He refused to answer these questions.
Initially it should be observed that the operation of a numbers business
per se is not violative of federal law, and the questions on their face do not
come within the federal privilege. Greenberg, however, contended that his
answers might tend to incriminat him of criminal violations of the internal
revenue laws relating to the income tax and the withholding of income and
social security taxes from employees' wages should it be established that he
was in the numbers business. The Third Circuit affinned the contempt
order, and held:
4"
Accordingly the witness 'must show the court enough beyond
his bare statement of crimination at least to indicate that his claim
was not clearly groundless, a contumacious assertion made in bad
faith.'
The Court found that the trial judge was justified in concluding that
a direct answer could not reasonably form a link in that chain and held:48
Where, as here, the question was innocent on its face all that
the appellant was required to do was to satisfy the court that there
was a reasonable possibility of the existence of facts in his situation
and under the circumstances of his case which might convict him
of a federal crime if a fact which might be disclosed by a direct
answer to the controverted question were added to them.
As far as the questions relating to his business were concerned the court
held that a witness may not decline to state his business, although itself not
unlawful under the federal law, upon the theory that he may have violated
some federal law in the course of the conduct of that business and that
subsequent questions with respect to the conduct of his business may develop
the delinquencies. There was no showing either as to how his knowledge of
other nunbers writers would incriminate him under the federal internal
revenue laws.
However, the Supreme Court granted Greenberg's petition for a
writ of certiorari and per curiam, vacated the Third Circuit judgment and
remanded the case to that court for reconsideration in the light of Hoffman
v. United States.47 The Third Circuit has again reconsidered the issue
48
and has held that the Hoffman case was distinguishable. In Hoffman the
44. 187 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1951).
45. Id. at 39.
46. Id. at 39.
47. Note 37 supra.
48. This opinion (Appeal No. 10,336) has not been reported as yet.
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witness was notoriously engaged (according to newspaper stories) in a busi-
ness violative of federal law. In Greenberg such was not the case. While
the "numbers business" is violative of state law, that does not incriminate
him of a federal law, the sine qua non of assertion of the privilege." The
Third Circuit concluded:
In the absence of any contention on Greenberg's part that
the mere disclosure of his business, as such, may tend to incriminate
him of a federal crime we regard the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Hoffman's case as wholly inapplicable.
In another recent case, Alexander v. United States,50 the defendant was
asked (1) if he knew the names of the officers of the Los Angeles County
Communist Party and (2) if he knew the table of organization and the
duties of the county officers of the Los Angeles County Communist Party.
The Ninth Circuit held that refusal to answer these questions was not
contempt because the court was apprised of the following facts showing
their criminatory character: (I) A previous witness had characterized the
defendant as a "Soviet espionage agent," (2) although the above questions
were innocent on their face, their association with previous questions
obviously incriminating under the Smith Act 51 established the criminatory
link, (3) there was a current move by the Attorney General to round up
leaders of the Communist Party as shown by indictments against eleven
Communist leaders in New York, and various newspaper articles, and (4)
there was a "peculiar selectivity" by service of subpoenas on fifteen persons
in Los Angeles at seven o'clock in the morning for testimony that morning,
showing that there was a local campaign to prosecute Los Angeles Com-
munists. The causal connection between the questions asked and possible
prosecution under the Smith Act is thus cearly shown in the Alexander case.
Facts were presented which demonstrated to the court the criminatory
character of questions which on their face were colorless (the mere knowledge
of Communists or Communist organization is not per se illegal).
The basic difficulty with the Hoftman doctrine is that it liberalizes the
privilege to the point where there is no compulsion on the witness asserting
it to do more than prove that the "atmosphere" of a particular investigation
puts the trial court on notice of the criminatory character of any question
that may be asked. He does not have to come forward, as in the Alexander
case and affirmatively demonstrate specifically the criminatory aspects of the
questions asked. He can merely claim that as the grand jury was investi-
gating various federal crimes, the unuttered answer to an innocent question
would supply the missing link establishing the perpetration of such a crime.
Such a bald assertion hardly demonstrates the realities of the situation to the
trial judge.
It might be argued that the court is reasonably apprised of the crim-
49. Cf. United States v. Murdock, supra note 12 at 149; 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
50. 181 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1946).
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inatory character of a question by newspaper publicity given to a particular
defendant. In the Hofman case such evidence was not demonstrated to the
judge until after the order adjudging the defendant in contempt had been
signed. There is, however, something offensive in this type of showing. The
more notorious the criminal, the more publicity he gets in the local tabloids.
If he is illowed to bring such newspaper columns into court to demonstrate
the fact that he is "alleged" to be a certain type of criminal or engaged in
a particular criminal enterprise, he can thus demonstrate facts entitling him
to refuse to answer questions asked in a grand jury or legislative committee
investigation. Circumstances could be inagined where a criminal could
actually give out press releases to some tabloids which are not beyond print-
ing anything, and thereby protect himself from being questioned. The less
notorious criminal would not be as well protected. Recently a Senate Com-
mittee was investigating the "Amerasia Case." Certain questions were asked
a witness which were innocent on their face. Although the witness refused
to answer these questions, asserting his privilege, he maintained he had no
duty to make any showing that the questions were criminatory. The court
in United States v. Jaffe,52 however, refused to find him in contempt on the
basis that reasonable grounds for apprehension existed justifying his refusal.
Twenty-nine newspaper articles and a Scripps-Howard bulletin were found
by the court to illustrate the criminality of the questions. The court observed
that these articles would not be admissible in evidence but were admissible
to show comments that may have reasonably caused apprehension to a
witness. The court said: 53
The flood of such newspaper publicity for many weeks im-
mediately prior to the testimony of this defendant with reference to
his connection with the Amerasia case, his reputed connection with
Communist activities, and association with persons engaged in
furthering Communist objectives is abundantly revealed in exhibits
filed in the instant case.
This type of showing could certainly encourage the worst features of
criminal reporting.
CONCLUSION.
Today more than ever is there need for clear definitions to guide the
nisi prius court in its administration of the great caseload of criminal actions.
This is especially true of a rule of constitutional origin. Its limits and
qualifications must be defined to insure a uniformity of application, and
a standard of legal predictability. In safeguarding the constitutional privilege
of remaining mute to a question, the answer to which would forge a link
with a crime, some objective standards must be maintained to insure that
a witness cannot refuse to answer contumaciously. The standard set forth
in United States v. Weisman54 seems the most wise. That rule would require
52. 98 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. D.C. 1951).
53. Id. at 194.
54. Note 36 sulra.
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that when a question is asked which does not bear the badge of criminality,
the witness, in order to avail himself of the privilege, must suggest in some
way the causal link between an answer and some crime. He must "be
content with the door's being set a little ajar" in order to claim the privilege.
It is not possible to suggest any universal way this can be done, but it would
seem that something beyond the mere "atmosphere" of the investigation
should be adduced to show the criminatory character of the questions. It
would also be preferable to require some showing beyond newspaper articles
to establish this fact. The Alexander case suggests the way a witness may
make such an offer of proof. Clearer objective standards are vitally requisite
in this area of conflicting rights.
Correction: The sentence beginning "Weekly benefits . under the heading
Vorkmen's Compensation in 6 MIAMI LAw QUARTERLY 59 (1951) should read: Weekly
benefits in unemployment insurance are increased forn a maximum of $15 to a maximum
of $20.
